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AI Agent Security
AI agent security: govern what agents do, not just what they are
AI agent security is the control of what AI agents actually do with the access they've been given — beyond which agent connected. Agents now hold real permissions and act autonomously on real systems, which turns identity governance into a runtime-control problem: the question is no longer "is this agent allowed here?" but "is a real, authorized person behind this action?"
The problem
Agents act, and access tools only watch the door.
An AI agent granted access behaves like an employee with credentials — it reads, writes, executes, and moves between systems. Three realities make that hard to govern with the current stack.
Agents act autonomously
Once authorized, an agent's actions run without a human review step. Permissions are checked at the connection; the actions that follow are assumed.
Agents can be redirected
Prompt injection can send an agent off its task. The agent is still authenticated; its permissions still apply. Every action it takes looks authorized.
Not every agent is known
Teams adopt AI tools faster than security can inventory them. Agents operate in environments where nobody has decided — or documented — that they should.
The gap in current approaches
Identity ≠ authority
The emerging answer in the market is agent identity: give each agent its own credentials, permissions, and lifecycle — non-human identity (NHI) management extended to AI. That work matters, and it inherits a familiar limit. Knowing which agent acted is not the same as knowing a person authorized the action. An agent with a well-managed identity can still be prompt-injected; its actions still carry valid credentials. Identity tells you the actor. It doesn't tell you the authority behind the act.
Early access
Bind the action to the person.
Keystrike's AI-agent protection — in early access now — applies to agents the same test the platform applies to a human keystroke: an agent action proceeds only when it traces, via device-bound cryptographic evidence, to the intent of a specific authorizing person; an agent acting on its own — prompt-injected, for example — is blocked in real time from excess authorization. Every governed agent action becomes cryptographic, tamper-evident evidence bound to the authorizing person.
Enforcement and agent-action evidence reach early-access participants first, ahead of general availability.
Sign up for early access →
Current Keystrike clients get first access.
Prompt injection
Verify the authority, not the instruction.
Most prompt-injection defenses try to detect the injection — filter the input, spot the hostile instruction, judge the agent's behaviour. Detection is probabilistic: it catches what it recognizes. Keystrike's position is different: don't judge the instruction, verify the authority.
An injected agent's action carries no binding to an authorizing person, so it fails the same deterministic test every other action faces — whatever the injection said, however novel it was. The injection isn't detected; the unauthorized action doesn't proceed.
Shadow AI
You can't govern what you haven't found.
Before any agent can be governed, it has to be known. Keystrike delivers agentless visibility into chatbot and AI-agent activity originating from managed endpoints that interact with cloud-resident sensitive resources — an early version is running with current clients today, included for every customer. Deploying the Keystrike client extends that visibility to surface shadow AI — the use of unmanaged or personal accounts against corporate assets — arriving through the early-access program.
"What are our agents doing?" — the honest first answer is usually "we don't know what our agents are."
Get Free Evaluation of Shadow-AI in Your Environment →
Intent-Based Security
Part of one platform.
AI-agent protection is the newest surface of the same mechanism that governs privileged remote sessions in production today. This is Intent-Based Security, delivered by Keystrike as the Intent-Based Security Platform: one control — verify every action is bound to an authorized person — across remote sessions, agentic work, and third-party access. The session foundation is in production today; AI-agent protection extends it through early access.
FAQ
Common questions
By binding each action to an authorizing person. An agent action proceeds only when it traces, via device-bound cryptographic evidence, to the intent of a specific authorizing person — permissions alone aren't enough. Enforcement arrives through the AI-agent early-access program.
Not by detecting the injection — by verifying the authority. A prompt-injected agent acts on its own, so its actions carry no binding to an authorizing person and are blocked in real time from excess authorization. Deterministic, whatever the injection said.
NHI management gives an agent its own identity and permissions — it answers "which agent is this?" Keystrike answers the next question: "which person authorized this action?" An agent can have a perfectly managed identity and still act without authority; the person-binding is what catches that.
It complements and strengthens them. Identity and permissions decide what an agent may do; Keystrike verifies a person is behind what it does, and produces the evidence. Different control points, same stack.
Two things: get agentless visibility into the AI activity running from your managed endpoints (an early version is live with current clients, included for every customer), and join the early-access program — for shadow-AI surfacing via the Keystrike client and for enforcement.
AI Agent Security