For a while, Privileged Access Management (PAM) was the shining white knight of cybersecurity—the protector of sensitive systems separating privileged accounts from regular accounts, PAM would contain the damage caused by stolen credentials, ensuring that access was limited and temporary. In theory, it was the perfect hero for the job.

But developing cybersecurity is like building on quicksand: the arms race between hackers and defenders is relentless and underlying assumptions are rapidly undermined. Today’s hackers are not merely breaking down doors but also slipping through the cracks. Invisible attack methods abound, such as "living off the land" (LOTL) tactics, stealthily exploring trusted environments and remaining dormant until privileged access is granted. Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are now actively waiting for their opportunity to launch into action.

At that moment, the attackers strike, hijacking legitimate sessions and rendering PAM’s shining armor into little more than a flimsy shield. The hero has been categorically dethroned by the adversary's technological advances. 

What is Privileged Access Management (PAM)?

Privileged Access Management is a security strategy that enforces strict controls over elevated access to critical systems. Its primary focus is to mitigate the risks associated with compromised credentials, especially those of administrators with high access levels, by using those privileges sparingly, narrowly, and observantly

Core Features of PAM

The following are some central features offered by today’s PAM security suites:

• Temporary Elevated Privileges: Administrators gain only the specific access they need for a task, and this access is revoked when the task is completed. The intent is to minimize the window of opportunity for the attacker.
• Granular Controls: PAM limits what a person can do during their sessions, preventing unrestricted access to the entire system.
• Auditing and Logging: All privileged activities are logged, providing an audit trail for compliance and forensic analysis.

How PAM Emerged

PAM was developed to extend the principle of least privilege — the idea that a person should only have access to the resources necessary for their roles. By enforcing strict controls over privileged accounts, PAM seeks to limit the attack surface available to cybercriminals.

Before PAM, administrators often had persistent, high-level access to sensitive systems. This ticking time bomb created significant risks when the admin’s credentials were compromised. In this narrative, PAM adds an extra layer of protection and security by reducing the time windows in which administrative access tokens are valid. This forces attackers to both hijack authentication tokens and use them at the right time.

What PAM Looks Like in Practice

The workflow of using PAM in your infrastructure typically involves three key concepts.

• Access Request: Administrative users must explicitly request elevated privileges through the PAM system, specifying their needs and duration. Variations on the theme, like Just-In-Time (JIT) PAM, may provision accounts tailored for the task at hand.
• Verification and Authentication: PAM systems establish trust with multi-factor authentication (MFA) before granting the privileged access to the account.
• Session Termination: After completing the task or when the allocated time expires, PAM automatically revokes access.

On the positive side, this structured approach is helpful in mitigating risks from stolen credentials. If an attacker compromises a standard employee account, they would still need to navigate PAM’s access request processes to escalate their privileges—something that’s not easily done without detection. Furthermore, when a privileged account becomes compromised, PAM’s tight time windows force the attack to unfold at the exact right time. 

Why PAM Must Evolve for the Era of Advanced Persistent Threats

On the flip side, while PAM helps address traditional credential-based threats, it still struggles against modern tactics like “living off the land” (LOTL) attacks. This attack methodology, used by ransomware groups and advanced state actors (APT), exploits legitimate tools and sessions within an environment, blending into normal operations to avoid detection.

LOTL attacks love to use built-in administrative tools, scripts, and processes to perform malicious activities. 

Why LOTL Attacks Defeat PAM

1. Evades signature-based detection at the outset: Assumptions that EDR will intercept the exploited process or application before an attack begins are flawed and risky. Attackers bypass detection mechanisms by leveraging trusted processes, making preemptive identification highly unlikely. 
2. Monitors authenticated sessions for escalation: LOTL attackers stay dormant, silently monitoring until privilege escalation occurs. Once a new session with elevated privileges is authenticated, they are poised to act. PAM, designed to grant such sessions, unwittingly provides the opportunity.
3. Injects malicious commands into active sessions: When a privileged session is established, attackers inject commands directly into the authorized session. This process injection exploits PAM’s intended functionality. PAM, functioning as designed, is blind to the malicious payload within the authorized activity.
4. Bypasses heuristic detection mechanisms: LOTL attackers exploit legitimate administrator sessions, eliminating the anomalies needed to trigger heuristics. The attack originates from a trusted machine, uses an authorized account, and leverages MFA-verified credentials. The connection targets assets for which the administrator has legitimate access, blending seamlessly into normal activity. With no detectable behavioral anomalies, PAM remains powerless to identify the intrusion.

LOTL attackers exploit the assumption that all actions performed within an authorized privileged session are legitimate. Since PAM doesn’t verify the source of commands during active sessions, these blind spots leave organizations vulnerable. Alarmingly, these attacks are easy to carry out for the attacker if they are patient enough to wait for a privileged session to be established.

Step-by-Step Attack Flow: How LOTL Exploits PAM

To understand how "living off the land" (LOTL) attacks exploit the limitations of Privileged Access Management (PAM), consider the following scenario broken into sequential steps:

Step 1: Establishing initial foothold
The attacker gains an initial foothold by compromising the administrator’s workstation, often through social engineering, phishing, illicit purchase of access tokens, or by exploiting system vulnerabilities. It’s jaw-droppingly easy to find “Initial Access Brokers” to purchase active tokens from on the dark web if you know where to find them.

Step 2: Living off the land As post exploitation actors take over, they remain inactive to evade detection, blending in with legitimate processes or simply observing and waiting for a privileged session to begin.

Step 3: Authenticating as an administrator
The administrator logs into the PAM-protected system and authenticates using credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA). The OTP proves the request is legitimate, and it is actually legitimate, thus PAM grants the access and elevated privileges.

Step 4: Granting privileged access
The administrator receives temporary elevated privileges for a specific task. PAM establishes the session, considering it is authenticated, legitimate and secure. At this point, believing its job is finished, PAM gets out of the way and allows the admin to interact freely with the server it was protecting.

Step 5: Hijacking the session
The privileged session triggers the attack to activate. The attack process either hijacks the ongoing session by setting up a proxy, or injects malicious commands directly into the process responsible for the established session. PAM, unable to differentiate these malicious commands from legitimate admin actions, allows them all and the rogue commands are invisible to the authorized person who is using the session concurrently.

Step 6: Gaining privileged access
Using the compromised session, the attacker now moves through the network covertly impersonating the authorized admin, accessing systems, establishing further control, backdooring systems, exfiltrating data, or deploying ransomware.

Why Does PAM Fail in This Scenario?

PAM was designed to protect admin accounts in the era of password and token compromise. By limiting privileges only to the tasks in which they are necessary, PAM is effective at reducing the window in which the attack can occur down to only while the authorized administrator is working. However, attackers have evolved and PAM cannot reliably establish a root of trust when workstations are compromised. 

Since deploying ransomware can be deployed in just a few minutes, triggering attacks based on when new administrative sessions are established efficiently bypasses PAM.  The assumption that all actions within an authenticated session are legitimate renders PAM ineffective in denying access to APT leveraging LOTL techniques. This vulnerability shows the need for enhanced security measures beyond traditional credential-based controls.

Elite attackers play the long game and their patience cannot be underestimated. They are more inclined to wait for the right moment than to try to force an action which will likely trigger detection. 

Consequences and Risks of PAM Limitations

When PAM’s blind spots are exploited, the consequences can be devastating:

• Lateral Movement: Attackers use privileged access to infiltrate additional systems, broadening their foothold and expanding the scope of the attack.
• Data Exfiltration: Sensitive data is accessed or stolen during the hijacked session, often going unnoticed due to the use of legitimate credentials.
• Operational Disruption in OT Environments: Attackers targeting operational technology can disable critical processes, such as halting assembly lines in factories, shutting down turbines at power plants, or introducing incorrect chemicals into municipal water supplies. These actions result in significant physical, financial, and operational damage.
• Ransomware Attacks: Attackers leverage privileged accounts to deploy ransomware, locking critical systems or data and demanding payment for recovery. This creates severe financial strain and operational paralysis.
• Compliance Risk: Breaches tied to inadequate protection of privileged accounts can result in compliance violations, leading to fines, legal consequences, and reputational harm.

These risks underscore the pressing need for additional security measures beyond traditional PAM implementations.

Shortcomings of Credential-Centric Approaches

PAM relies on credentials, and usually MFA, to establish its trust in an account’s identity. However, this credential-centric model has significant limitations:

• One-Time Verification: PAM verifies credentials at the start of a session but does not persistently check, and assumes the session was not compromised.
• Doesn’t Understand Who is Using the Account: PAM systems have no way to verify who created the commands being sent while the administrator is working, which creates a blindspot for process injection.

The results are an open window for attackers. Once access is granted, attackers can act without interference until the session ends because it is acting as the authorized person now.

While MFA and continuous authentication are often used to strengthen security, they do not address the core issue: verifying the legitimacy and intent of each command during an active session.

PAM Solved a Problem. Then Attackers Evolved.

Privileged Access Management was built to guard the gates, but in today’s threat landscape, the moats no longer protect the windows so we have to protect them too. Modern attackers don’t smash through walls—they slip inside, waiting for the moment privileged access is granted. Once in, APT becomes indistinguishable from your administrators. PAM doesn’t see the difference, and that’s the problem.

This isn’t just a vulnerability—it’s an invitation. Attackers thrive on assumptions: that credentials mean control and that sessions mean safety. But assumptions don’t protect networks; vigilance does. It’s not enough to lock the front door when you can’t tell your spouse from an intruder..

The challenge is clear: we need more than credential trust. We need proof based on a reliable root of trust. Every action, every command, must be verified in real-time. Because in cybersecurity, trust isn’t enough—certainty is.

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